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INTRODUCTION
IN RESPONSE TO WORRIES ABOUT THE COERCIVE TACTICS of hostile bidders in cor-
porate takeovers-particularly front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers-states be-
gan to enact antitakeover legislation in the 1980s to ensure a fair outcome between
bidders and holdout shareholders.' The idea behind the front-end loaded, two-tier
tender offer is simple By offering a higher price for, say, fifty-one percent of a
target's shares in the first step of a tender offer, and a lower price for the remaining
shares if control is established during the first step, a bidder can presumably induce
more shareholders to tender their shares than would have been possible in a single-
tier tender offer? Partial offers may have a similar coercive effect because target
shareholders may fear that the acquirer will loot the company. Coercion may there-
fore lead to the target corporation's sale at too low a price. As a result, the long-
term business plans of incumbent management may be threatened by a hostile
bidder, thereby reducing the incentive to innovate. Nevertheless, courts and regula-
tors have been reluctant to prohibit partial and two-tier tender offers because of the
perceived benefits to shareholders
Control share statutes are one of several types of state takeover laws designed to
reduce coercion.' The Indiana Control Share Acquisitions Act ("Indiana Act"),6
which the Supreme Court upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,7 has
been widely used as a model by other states adopting control share statutes. As of
. Associate, Blades & Rosenfeld, P.A.
1. Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 1635, 1637 (1988).
2. Id. at 1640.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1643. See also Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 176-77 (2d. Cir 1955) (holding that control-
ling shareholder is liable to minority shareholders for a sale of his controlling shares if he deprives the corpora-
tion of a possible gain).
5. See Booth, supra note 1, at 1672-78 (discussing other state takeover statutes such as fair price statutes,
business combination statutes, disclosure statutes and appraisal statutes).
6. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 to -11 (2003).
7. 481 U.S. 69, 86-87, 94 (1987).
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the year 2000, twenty-seven states had some form of control share statute.8 In es-
sence, control share acquisition statutes, such as the Indiana Act, prohibit any per-
son or group that acquires a specified percentage, e.g., twenty percent, of
outstanding shares in a covered company from voting those shares unless a major-
ity of disinterested shareholders vote to restore voting rights.9
Control share statutes are designed to reduce coercion by protecting holdout
shareholders in proposed tender offers and changes in corporate control.'0 The
statutes accomplish this goal by giving holdout shareholders an effective veto
through the right to vote collectively on sales of control, thereby reducing opportu-
nities for coercion and reducing private pre-offer purchases."
Control share statutes also reduce coercion by giving holdout shareholders, in
effect, the ability to negotiate for better terms in the back end." For example, if a
corporation does not opt out of the Indiana Act, 3 then whenever a bidder in an
unsolicited tender offer acquires more than twenty percent of the outstanding
shares of a company, the bidder-either an inside manager or director, or an
outside acquiring individual or group-will be unable to vote those shares until a
majority of the remaining eighty percent of shareholders vote favorably to grant the
bidder that right. 4 In short, the shares the bidder acquires are "sterilized" until the
bidder receives voting rights from the remaining holdout shareholders."
Further, control share statutes level the playing field by excluding the incumbent
controlling shareholders from voting to reinfranchise control shares, leaving only
the disinterested holdout shareholders to decide whether a transaction should go
through." Control share statutes therefore act as a negotiating mechanism in front-
end loaded, two-tier tender offers, where there exist the competing interests of
management who seek to remain in control of the corporation and holdout share-
holders who seek the highest premium for their shares. 7 As a result, holdout share-
8. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence of the
"Race"Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1828 (2002) (noting in Table 3 all states
as of 2000 that have enacted some form of control share statutes).
9. Booth, supra note 1, at 1678.
10. Evan M. Kjellenberg, The Model Control Share Act Is The Best State Takeover Law Alternative, 8 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1988).
11. Booth, supra note 1, at 1681-82.
12. Id. at 1681, 1683.
13. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-5 (2003) (stating that a corporation may opt out by including a provision in the
bylaws or articles of incorporation providing that the Indiana Act shall not apply, so long as such a provision is
added before a control share acquisition occurs).
14. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (2003). Disinterested shares (i.e., those persons who are allowed to vote to
reinfranchise control shares) under the Indiana Act are shares held by anyone except those shares held by the
acquiring person as a result of the control share acquisition, those held by any officer of the issuing public
corporation, and those held by any employee of the issuing corporation who is also a director. See IND. CODE
§ 23-1-42-3 (2003).
15. Booth, supra note 1, at 1679.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1684.
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holders' votes become equally valuable to the bidder who wants the shareholders to
tender their shares and to management, who likely want to remain in control of the
corporation. By denying interested shareholders such as the bidder and incumbent
management the right to vote to reinfranschise shares acquired in a control share
transaction, disinterested holdout shareholders hold the ultimate power to decide
whether a tender offer is in their best interest."m
Finally, by requiring a shareholder vote on all sales of control, statutes such as
the Indiana Act grant holdout shareholders the right to vote on whether inside sales
of control ever go through.'9 Such was the case in Perlman v. Feldmann, which
coincidentally involved an Indiana corporation.2" A sale of control is essentially
equivalent to a partial bid by an outsider.2 That is, an outside purchaser may be
motivated to pay a premium for the controlling shares because he intends to loot
the corporation or because the purchaser believes he can make the corporation
more profitable and can buy the corporation at the lowest price by dealing only
with the controlling shareholder.22 In either case, control share statues give the
holdout shareholders the right to vote on whether such sales should go through.23
Today there are few front-end loaded, two-tier tender offers. Nevertheless, com-
mentators continue to debate the inherent coercive nature of tender offers.24 Argua-
bly, the use of such tactics has declined because of increased competition among
bidders, the use of defensive tactics such as the poison pill by target corporations,
and the effect of state takeover statutes. Thus, legal scholars have favored control
share statutes in concept, but have also recognized that these statutes were by no
means perfect as enacted. Indeed, it has been argued that these statutes may have
resulted in numerous unforeseen consequences.25 A recent decision by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Simon Property Group,
Inc. v. Taubman Centers, Inc.26 offers a prime example.
Taubman Centers Inc. (TCI) is a publicly traded real estate investment trust that
conducts its regional shopping center operations through a limited partnership
18. See id. at 1682-83.
19. Booth, supra note 1, at 1690.
20. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
21. Booth, supra note 1, at 1690.
22. id.
23. Id. Control share statutes may also have some negative effects. For example, friendly buyers will now
need to offer the same assurances as hostile bidders, which may increase the cost of friendly sales and reduce
their frequency. Id.
24. See Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti, and Timo Rehbok, Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma:
Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus. LAW 519,
536-43 (2003).
25. See Booth, supra note 1, at 1681-82.
26. 240 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion
to dismiss); 261 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction), vacated by 373 F.3d
656 (6th Cir. 2004).
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known as Taubman Realty Group L.P. (TRG).27 TCI is the managing partner of
TRG. In 1998 when it was learned that a limited partner was going to withdraw its
investment in TRG, the board of directors of TCI authorized a new class of stock,
called Series B Preferred Stock, to be issued to the limited partners of TCI, includ-
ing the Taubman family.28 The move was arguably intended to simplify the owner-
ship structure of the company, which it was thought had contributed to a low stock
price. Before the new shares were issued, the Taubman family controlled a one-
percent voting interest in TCI. Afterwards, the family gained a thirty-percent voting
interest in TCI.
OPERATING INTERESTS IN TRG BEFORE AND AFTER
ISSUANCE OF SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK
Owners Before After
GM 38% -
TC 39% 63%
Taubman Family 23% 37%
OWNERSHIP INTERESTS IN TCI BEFORE AND AFTER
SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK WAS ISSUED
Owners Before After
Other Shareholders 79% 66.4%
GM 20% --
Taubman Family 1% 30%
Taubman Family with Voting Agreements - 33.6%
On November 13, 2002, Simon Property Group (SPG) publicly announced its
offer to purchase all the outstanding stock of TC. TCI issued a press release re-
jecting the offer on the same day. The following day, Robert Taubman "filed a
Schedule 13D/A with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) advising that
he had entered into voting agreements with three, unrelated shareholders ... for
27. TRG partnership interests are allocated as units. The Taubman family owned about 23% of these units
and the General Motors (GM) pension trust, and TCI owned the remaining units. In 1998, GM decided to
reduce its interest in TCI/TRG. Each limited partner in TRG received one share of Series B Preferred Stock for
each TRG unit held. As a result, the Tuabman family's voting power in TCI increased to 30% after the Series B
Preferred Stock was issued.
28. In 1992, when TCI was taken public, 99% of the common stock was owned by public shareholders,
including the GM pension trust that owned about 20% of the common stock of TCI. The limited partners each
received one share of Series B stock for each TRG unit held, at $.001 per share.
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the purposes of preventing an unsolicited takeover of the company."29 The voting
agreements combined with the Series B stock issued gave the Taubman family con-
trol of 33.6% of the voting stock of TCI and a blocking position over a sale of the
corporation and the amendment or elimination of an excess share provision. °
The Simon court faced three issues. First, did SPG have standing to bring a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty based on the issuance of the Series B stock?3' Second,
was the Series B stock issued by the TCI board to the Taubman family a control
share acquisition under the Michigan Control Share Acquisition Act ("Michigan
Act")?32 Third, was the share acquisition that gave Robert Taubman and the Taub-
man family 33.6% voting power in TCI a group acquisition governed by the Michi-
gan Act?" The court in Simon, following Delaware law as set forth in Omnicare, Inc.
v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,34 found that SPG did not have standing to challenge the
issuance of Series B stock as a breach of fiduciary duty because SPG was not a
shareholder at the time the stock was issued." Further, relying on a single comment
to the Indiana Act interpreting the meaning of the phrase "issued and outstanding,"
the Simon court held that issuing new shares to TCI did not constitute a control
share acquisition within the meaning of the Michigan Act.36 The court did find,
however, that the formation of a group by the Taubman family may have consti-
tuted a control share acquisition.37
The question of what constitutes the formation of a group has been largely re-
solved by the state courts with guidance from the federal courts.38 Although neither
the Michigan Act nor the Indiana Act defines the term group, the comments to the
Indiana Act say the term group as used in section 13(d) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act39 offers clear guidance to state courts when determining the existence of
29. Simon, 261 F. Supp. 2d. at 927 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
30. Id. "TCI's Articles of Incorporation, via its 'Excess Share Provision,' prohibit anyone from acquiring
shares in excess of 8.23% of the value of the outstanding capital stock of TCI (except certain persons who may
own up to 9.9%)." Id. at 925. Further, "the provision can only be amended or eliminated by a two-thirds vote
of TCI's shareholders." Id.
31. Id. at 932.
32. Simon Prop. Group, Inc. v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (E.D. Mich. 2003). See also
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1790 to -1799 (2003).
33. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 646.
34. 809 A.2d 1163 (Del. Ch. 2002).
35. Simon, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 933-34.
36. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49.
37. Id. at 651. The court in a subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction held that "the Taubman
family formed a group for the purpose of obtaining the practical ability to direct 33.6% of the voting power of
TCI." Simon, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 943, Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal granted, 262 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Mich.
2003). In September 2003, the Michigan Legislature passed Public Act 181 amending MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 450.1791, which provided that the "formation of a group does not constitute a control share acquisition"
under the Michigan Act and added MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.1798a to ensure that the new law retroactively
affected the Simon case directly. Glancy v. Taubman Centers, Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 661 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004).
38. See Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Alizac Partners, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,445 (W.D. Mich. 1991);
Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (2000).
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a group under the Indiana Act.4" Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Michigan in Atlantis Group Inc. v. Alizac Partners4 cited and relied on
the Indiana comments and section 13(d) to resolve the definition of a group under
the Michigan Act.42
The Simon case raises two issues-whether forming a group of already existing
shareholders to acquire a controlling interest above the statutory limit violates the
Michigan Act and whether newly issued shares to controlling shareholders above
the statutory limit violates the Michigan Act. But they are actually the same issue. 3
For example, the formation of a group is essentially another means of acquiring
shares and may be viewed as a new owner under control share statutes. Accord-
ingly, the open question remains the same: whether a control share acquisition
occurs when an entity issues new voting shares to an existing controlling share-
holder resulting in an increase in voting control over the statutory limit.44
The Simon case offers a prime example of how several state courts and model
acts have addressed this question. Accordingly, Part I of this Article will address the
Simon court's reasoning, followed by a discussion of how several other states and
model acts have addressed the same question. After highlighting some of the incon-
sistencies and unforeseen consequences the Simon decision will have on current
and future minority shareholders during tender offers, and how other courts and
model acts have dealt with the same issue, Part II will address some of the legisla-
tive responses to cases such as Simon. Part III will describe why control share stat-
utes on their face should apply to newly issued shares, even if courts are not
applying the statutes in this fashion. Moreover, Part III will analyze why excluding
newly issued shares from control share statutes does not reduce coercion, en-
trenches incumbent management, and cuts against the intent of control share stat-
utes, which were designed to level the playing field among bidders and holdout
shareholders.
40. Breaud, 657 So. 2d at 1343.
41. Atlantis Group, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) " 96,445 at 91,939.
42. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
43. The court in Simon states that control share acquisitions mean one of two things: "either the 'acquisi-
tion, directly or indirectly, by any person of ownership of... issued and outstanding control shares...' or '...
the power to direct the exercise of voting power with respect to, issued and outstanding control shares." 216 F.
Supp. 2d. 919, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Nevertheless, the issue remains the same because any transaction in
which a person or group acquires the substantive practical ability to vote or direct the voting power within the
ranges specified in the Michigan Act will constitute a control share acquisition. See id. at 942 (citing IND. CODE
§ 23-1-42-2, Official Comments).
44. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1790(2) (2003) (stating the statutory limits of voting power that trigger
the Michigan Act).
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I. THE VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF CONTROL SHARE STATUTES
A. Michigan
The issue facing the court in Simon was the Michigan Act's definition of a control
share acquisition in the context of the phrase "issued and outstanding."4 Under the
Michigan Act, a "'control share acquisition' means the acquisition, directly or indi-
rectly, by any person of ownership of, or the power to direct the exercise of voting
power with respect to, issued and outstanding control shares."46 After recognizing
that there is limited case law interpreting the Michigan Act, and none dealing with
the specific question raised, the court in Simon turned to the Indiana Act for assis-
tance in interpreting the Michigan Act.47 In support of TCI's position that the
phrase "issued and outstanding" applies only to issued and outstanding shares, the
court cites a single brief statement from the Official Comments from the Indiana
Act:
Because "control share acquisition" is defined as the acquisition of already "is-
sued and outstanding" control shares, a person's acquisition from the corpora-
tion itself of shares that were previously not issued or outstanding (such as
newly authorized shares, or treasury shares being reissued) will not constitute a
"control share acquisition," even if the acquisition puts that person over one of
the [Ind. Code §] 23-1-42-I's three thresholds of voting power. However, that
person's acquisition of the same number of shares in a public offering (rather
than directly from the corporation) would constitute a "control share acquisi-
tion," since the shares will already have been "issued" (to an underwriter)
before being acquired by that person.48
The court dismissed SPG's argument that the Michigan Legislature intended for
the Michigan Act to apply to newly issued shares49 and found that by adopting
language similar to that of the Indiana Act, it was proper to infer that the Michigan
Legislature adopted the intent of the Indiana Legislature as well."° Therefore, the
45. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 647.
46. MICH. COMp. LAws § 450.1791(1) (2003). Note that the definition of control acquisition is materially
identical under the Indiana Act. See IND. CODE § 23-1-42-2 (2003).
47. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 647. The Michigan Act was modeled after the Indiana Act and adopts the
language of the Indiana Act almost in its entirety. Id. at 648.
48. Id. at 647 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-2, Official Comments).
49. Id. at 648. SPG offered into evidence an affidavit from one of the lawyers who drafted the Michigan
Act. The affidavit disputed whether the Michigan Act intended to exempt newly issued shares and whether, if at
all, Michigan intended to adopt the language and comments of the Indiana Act. Id. at 647-48.
50. Id. at 648. The court appears to be correct in its decision that it is proper to infer that Michigan has
adopted the intent of the Indiana Legislature. In People v. Stoudemire, the Michigan Legislature adopted the
language of a New York statute in its entirety and the Michigan Supreme Court stated that "[b]y borrowing
New York's statute in its entirety, the Legislature indicated that it was motivated by the same purpose that
underlay the New York statute" and that it is appropriate for a court "to infer legislative intent from the
purpose of similar statutes." Id. (citing People v. Stoudemire, 414 N.W.2d 693, 697- 98 (Mich. 1987)).
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court found that issuing the Series B stock was not a control share acquisition
within the meaning of the Michigan Act.5
Michigan courts have also previously relied on the Indiana Act when interpreting
the Michigan Act, specifically when interpreting the definition of the term group."
The Official Comments to the Indiana Act offer guidance in defining the term
group, because neither the Indiana Act nor the Michigan Act defines the term. 3
The Official Comments state that the Indiana Legislature's approach was similar to
that adopted in section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 4 Accordingly, the
court in Simon cites several well-established factors in determining the existence of
a group: (i) whether there is either a formal or informal understanding between
individuals for the purpose of acquiring or holding securities; (ii) whether there
were representations to third parties by members of a group that they together
control a block of shares, even though those shares are registered with the company
as being owned by individuals; and (iii) the action the group takes that affects the
corporate direction of the company.55
In applying these facts, the court quickly finds sufficient evidence to infer the
formation of a group. First, the court notes that the Taubman family and other
shareholders gave Robert Taubman sole and absolute authority to vote their shares
through voting agreements. 6 Second, friends of the Taubman family exercised op-
tions and subsequently granted Robert Taubman sole authority to vote their
shares.5 7 Third, and most damaging, the Schedule 13D filed by the Taubman family
clearly indicates that as a result of the various transactions and agreements the
Taubman family controlled a 33.6% interest in TCI and the members of the group
entered these agreements for the purpose of preventing an unsolicited takeover of
the company.58
Despite the court's reliance on the Indiana Act, the language in the Michigan Act
does not clearly include or exclude shares issued directly to incumbent manage-
ment. Nevertheless, the Michigan courts have decided to follow the reasoning of
the Indiana Legislature and courts.
51. Id. at 648-49.
52. Id. at 648 (citing Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Alizac Partners, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 96,445 at 91,940
(W.D. Mich. 1991)).
53. Id. at 649.
54. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (2000)).
55. Id. at 649-50. (citing Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1343-44 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Hallwood
Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, LP, 286 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 2002)). See also Text of NASAA-ABA Model
Control Share Act, Preliminary Statement, and Comments (hereinafter the "Model Act"), 20 Sec. Reg. & Law
Report 708, 709 (BNA May 6, 1988) (including in the definition of "acquiring person". persons acting as a
group' as defined in sec. 13(d)(3) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934").
56. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
57. id.
58. Id.
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B. Indiana
Similar to the Michigan court, the Indiana Supreme Court in Young v. General
Acceptance Corp.59 upheld a lower court's finding that newly issued shares, which
were not part of the common stock that was issued and outstanding, were not
subject to the control share statute." In Young, Conseco Inc. pursued a tender offer
to acquire General Acceptance Corp. (GAC) by entering stockholders' agreements
and securities purchase agreements. A subsidiary of Conseco would invest a large
sum of money in return for subordinated convertible notes. These notes, in turn,
would be convertible into common shares of GAC upon proper written notice.
Before these agreements were entered into, there were roughly six million shares of
GAC common stock outstanding, and of those shares, roughly thirty percent were
owned by public shareholders, with the remaining seventy percent being owned by
the Algood family or family trusts. Just before Conseco made a merger proposal to
GAC, Conseco had acquired almost four million shares of GAC.
The court in Young quickly found that by definition the shares acquired by Con-
seco from GAC were not subject to the Indiana Act.6" Similar to the court in Simon,
the court in Young also found that stockholder agreements were "interested shares"
under the Indiana Act because Conseco held the ultimate power to exercise or
direct the voting power of the shares subject to the stockholder agreements.62 The
court reasoned that the stockholder agreements were different from a revocable
proxy because the commitments to vote were given for consideration and became
enforceable obligations.63 Nevertheless, the court in Young found an exception to
the Indiana Act because there was no fundamental change in the nature of the
corporation when Conseco acquired its control shares from GAC. Therefore, the
common shareholders were not disadvantaged.64
The court in Young found that the statute was intended to disenfranchise control
shares in a hostile takeover or similar transaction where the transaction causes the
entity to become dominated by a single shareholder or group of shareholders.65
Before Conseco's acquisition, GAC was controlled by the Algood family. Therefore,
the court reasoned that Conseco's acquisition of control shares did not shift GAC
into a corporation dominated by a single shareholder; rather, GAC had always been
dominated by a single shareholder.66 In sum, although the court in Young found
59. 770 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 2002).
60. Simon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (citing Young, 770 N.E.2d at 301).
61. 770 N.E.2d at 302.
62. Id.
63. id.
64. Id. at 303 (citing IND. CODE § 23-1-42-2(e) (2003)).
65. Id. See also Introductory Comment to IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 -11 (stating that the purpose of the
statute was to give shareholders a right to vote on "a potentially fundamental change in the nature of their
corporation-namely, its shift to being an entity in which a single shareholder acquires a significant level of
dominance").
66. Young, 770 N.E.2d at 303.
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that a transfer of voting power may occur through the sale of shares or by contract,
the court held that the Indiana Act does not apply to instances where a corporation
is controlled by a dominant shareholder who sells his dominant position to
another.67
The court's reasoning in Young is hard to reconcile with the plain language of the
Indiana Act or virtually any other control share statute. The Indiana Act requires
shareholder approval for all shares acquired above a certain percentage, for instance
thirty-three percent.6" Moreover, the Official Comments, while not technically
binding on courts, say the commission believed that the thirty-three percent
threshold was necessary because such a block of shares was sufficient to constitute
effective control of the company." Thus, it appears that the Indiana Act would
govern a sale of control by a controlling shareholder such as the sale of control in
Perlman v. Feldmann,7° which, in fact, involved an Indiana corporation.71
In this sense, a sale of control is essentially equivalent to a partial bid by an
outsider. For example, a purchaser may be motivated to pay a higher premium to
the controlling shareholder in order to loot the company, or the purchaser may
simply think he can make the company worth more and can gain control by having
to deal only with the controlling shareholder.7" This result may be a mixed blessing
for states with similar control share statutes.73 It seems only fair to apply the statute
equally to all sales of control, but sales of control may become less frequent and
more expensive as a result.74
Nevertheless, control share statutes are ostensibly designed to reduce coercion by
giving holdout shareholders a right to vote on any sale that will cause the corpora-
tion to become controlled by a single person or group. Therefore, it would make
little difference if the company was previously controlled by a single person or
group and subsequently sold to another controlling single person or group.75 In
either case, there has been a fundamental shift in control and holdout shareholders
are subject to the threat of coercion by such a sale. The basic question becomes
whether control share statutes are designed to ensure a fair outcome between a
bidder and holdout shareholders, or whether they are designed to protect local
companies by expanding the voting power of incumbent management. Although it
67. Id.
68. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (2003).
69. Id. at § 23-1-42-1, Official Comment (2003).
70. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
71. Booth, supra note 1, at 1690.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The opening comment to § 23-1-42-1 of the Indiana Act states that "itihe Control Share Acquisitions
Chapter reflects the General Assembly's recognition that a single shareholder's acquisition of a controlling
block of shares can be an equally fundamental, far-reaching event for the corporation" and "that it is appropri-
ate for shareholders to vote collectively on this issue as well." IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 cmt. (2003).
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appears that Michigan and Indiana favor the latter interpretation, other states have
taken a different position.
C. Utah
The Utah Supreme Court in Business Aviation of South Dakota, Inc. v. Medivest,
Inc.,76 offers a contradictory opinion to the Indiana Act's Official Comments. In
Business Aviation, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the Utah Control
Act ("Utah Act") applied to the issuance of new shares.77 The plaintiffs in Business
Aviation engaged an agent to assist in removing the current board of directors and
filed a Schedule 13D. According to the Schedule 13D, the plaintiffs sought to re-
move the board of directors because shareholders questioned the board's effective-
ness in discharging its fiduciary duties by intending to obtain control of the
company by soliciting proxies to elect new directors of the company. In response to
the plaintiff's filling a Schedule 13D, the Medivest, Inc., board issued more than
1,100,000 new shares to three current members of its board in order to maintain
control of the company by increasing the current board's percentage ownership of
stock.
The defendants in Business Aviation made two arguments, similar to those made
by TCI in Simon.7" First, the defendants argued that they were outside the purpose
of the Utah Act, which they claimed sought to protect Utah corporations from
hostile takeovers.79 Second, the defendants argued that the shares of stock the board
was issued were newly issued shares, rather than "issued and outstanding shares," to
which the Act has no application."80
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the first argument by finding that nowhere in
the Utah Act were the words outside, hostile, or takeover used."' The Utah court
emphasized that similarly, neither the Michigan Act nor the Indiana Act contains
these terms.8 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court in Business Aviation reasoned
that courts have no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention
not clearly expressed in the text, but rather should look to the specific language
used in the statute.8 3
76. 882 P.2d 662 (Utah 1994).
77. Id. at 664.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 664-65 (emphasis added).
82. See, IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1791(1) (2003).
83. Business Aviation, 882 P.2d at 665 (citing In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)).
The court also notes that the legislative history seems to indicate a more broad reading of the Utah Act, quoting
a Representative who states that the Act would allow "existing independent shareholders to evaluate offers from
both existing management and a proposed acquiring entity." Id. at 664-65 n. 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Floor Debate, vote on S.B. 3, 47th Legis., 1st Special Sess. (May 20, 1987) (House of Representatives Recording
No. 6)).
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The court went on to address the defendant's second argument that the phrase
"issued and outstanding" as used in the Utah Act does not apply to newly issued
shares to incumbent management.84 The court found that a reading of the Utah Act
excluding newly issued shares would be contrary to the intent of the Utah Act and
that the exclusion
would improperly allow a board of directors to defeat any challenge to their
control of a corporation by giving its members controlling voting power in the
form of additional shares of stock whenever shareholders seek the election of a
new board of directors.. . . Here, defendants, by issuing new shares [to the three
members of the board of directors] have changed the proportional voting power
of Medivest in order to maintain control of the corporation. In taking such
action, defendants have acquired the power to direct the exercise of the voting
power of Medivest in violation of the Act.8"
One difference between Business Aviation and Simon is that the acquiring corpo-
ration, and not shareholders, filed suit in Simon. Nevertheless, the premise was the
same. In both cases the control share statute was being used to prevent incumbent
management from maintaining or gaining control of the corporation by issuing
new shares to themselves. Control share statutes were designed to reduce coercion
by ensuring a fair outcome between bidders and holdout shareholders through a
requirement that shareholders vote on all sales of control.
As the court in Business Aviation recognized, coercion is not reduced by granting
carte blanche authority to incumbent management to issue new shares to them-
selves whenever their positions become threatened or when they do not believe a
tender offer is in the best interests of the corporation. While management surely
has the right to express its displeasure or unsatisfactory opinion concerning a
tender offer, a control share statute that excludes newly issued shares to directors
allows for management to cement their positions and effectively grants manage-
ment further control of the company in the form of an absolute veto right over
many decisions. More simply put, such a result grants too much power to incum-
bent management and negates any attempts by shareholders to remove current
management, remove corporate takeover defenses, or tender their shares in what
the holdout shareholders' believe is a profitable tender offer. These are precisely the
types of coercion that the control share statutes sought to prevent.
D. The Model Acts
The Model Control Share Act ("Model Act") echoes the similar position of the
Business Aviation court regarding the exclusion of newly issued shares. The Model
84. Id. at 665.
85. id.
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Act states in a preliminary statement that "the Joint Committee [departs] from the
Indiana Statute only for good reason."8 The commentary to section 3(e)(3)(K) of
the Model Act adds that "an exclusion covering acquisitions of control shares di-
rectly from the corporation is viewed by the Joint Committee as unduly favoring
management and evidencing a 'business protectionism' motivation, particularly
[because] it can be used as a first step in a management buyout series of
transactions.
'87
The Model Act is also at odds with the court in Young. The Model Act commen-
tary says that perhaps the greatest difference "between the Model Act and the Indi-
ana [Act] with respect to exclusions is that the Model Act does not contain an
exclusion for the acquisition from another person of control shares as to which
shareholders previously granted voting rights" in accordance with the Model Act.88
The commentary goes on to say, "it was the Joint Committee's determination not
to include such an exclusion on the basis that the purposes of a control share stat-
ute have more to do with the identity, characteristics and plans of the specific
acquiring person than with the block of stock."89 Further, the commentary states
that shareholders collectively should determine whether the acquiring person
should receive voting rights "based upon information contained in [a] disclosure
statement."98 Finally, the Model Act says that "an undisclosed transferee of such
person, who did not receive approval from the shareholders for the voting rights of
the block of control shares, may be as objectionable to the shareholders as the prior
control shareholder was unobjectionable."'"
The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA) also addresses the issue of newly
issued shares. The MBCA requires shareholder approval for any issuance of shares
where the voting power of the shares will compose more than twenty percent of the
voting power of the shares of the entire corporation during a merger or acquisi-
tion. 2 The MBCA, unlike the Indiana Act, does not eliminate the requirement of
shareholder approval when the shares are newly issued. Accordingly, it seems to be
consistent among the MBCA and the Model Act, which were enacted near the time
of many control share statutes, that exempting newly issued shares leads to the
entrenchment of management and does not reduce coercion in tender offers.
In sum, at least one court, the Model Act, and the MBCA have recognized some
of the problems of having an exemption for newly issued shares. The potential
problems of entrenching management, the lack of a reduction in coercion in tender
offers, and business protectionism seem evident in the cases discussed in this Arti-
86. Text of NASAA-ABA Model Control Share Act, Preliminary Statement, and Comments, 20 Sec. Reg. &
Law Report 708, 708 (BNA May 6, 1988).
87. Id. at 712.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f)(1) (1999).
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cle. Still, they will likely occur in the future unless state control share statutes are
amended. Nevertheless, state legislators appear to be taking the opposite position.
II. THE QUICK RESPONSE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
The true intent of control share statutes is arguable. In the wake of court decisions
that reduced incumbent management's power to maintain control of a corporation,
however, the actions of state legislatures suggest that control share statutes were not
passed with shareholder interests in mind, but as protectionist legislation. For ex-
ample, less than one year after the decision in Business Aviation, the Utah Legisla-
ture amended its control share statute to specifically exempt shares issued directly
from the corporation.93 The amendment essentially overruled the decision in Busi-
ness Associations, thus limiting the ability of future shareholders to remove incum-
bent management. Similarly, less than a month after the court's decision in Simon,
the Michigan Senate submitted Senate Bill 218 to amend the Michigan Act.94
Although Senate Bill 218 was never passed, submission of the bill offers further
evidence of state legislatures' business protectionist mentality and a lack of concern
for shareholder rights. Senate Bill 218 does not specifically exempt shares issued
directly from the corporation-it goes one step further and eliminates the need for
shareholder approval on control share transactions altogether. Senate Bill 218 pro-
posed to amend section 798(1) of the Michigan Act to enable the shareholders or
board of directors to approve a resolution restoring the voting rights of shares
acquired in a control transaction. 5 Currently, voting rights may be restored by a
majority of votes cast by shareholders entitled to vote.96 Under Senate Bill 218,
however, the board of directors could have restored voting rights either by a vote
"before or at the time of the control share acquisition, by a majority of the direc-
tors"97 or by a vote "after a control [transaction], by a majority of those directors in
office at the time of the approval who also were directors at the time of the control
share acquisition."9
Senate Bill 218 must be read in the context of the interested share provision in
the Michigan Act, which prevents any acquiring person, any officers of the corpora-
tion, or any employees of the corporation who are also directors from voting their
shares to reestablish voting rights to shares acquired in a control share transac-
93. UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-3(4)(e) (2005). The following is a list of other state statutes that have specific
exemptions for shares issued directly from the corporation: Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-18-301(a)(iii)(B)(IX)
(2005), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1287(c)(5) (2001), Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.015(4)(d) (2002), FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.0902 (2)(d)(7) (2002), MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-27-5 (e)(iii)(L) (2002), and OKLA. STAT. § 1146 (C)(8)
(2002).
94. S. 218 2003 Leg., 92nd Sess. (Mich. 2003).
95. Id. § 798(1).
96. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1798(2)(a) (2003).
97. S. 218, 2003 Leg. 92nd Sess. § 798(3)(a) (2003).
98. Id. § 798(3)(b).
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tion.99 In sum, the current Michigan Act does not allow those persons with inter-
ested shares to vote to restore voting rights. Senate Bill 218, however, would have
eliminated the need for a shareholder vote, thus eliminating the need to differenti-
ate between interested shares and disinterested shares. A majority of the board of
directors could simply issue shares to themselves to prevent a takeover and subse-
quently vote to restore voting rights in the control shares without ever seeking
shareholder approval.'
Currently only disinterested outside directors can vote to restore voting rights,
which at least somewhat reduces coercion and limits the possibility of entrenching
management. Under Senate Bill 218, however, there would have been no distinc-
tion between outside and inside directors, and all that would have been required
was a majority of the board's approval to restore voting rights. For example, even if
the court in Simon had held that shares issued directly from the corporation did
constitute a control share acquisition, shareholders would not have had veto rights
on whether the transaction went through. Rather, those directors who were previ-
ously considered interested parties, and could not vote to reestablish voting rights
in the control shares,'0 ' could simply vote to reestablish voting rights in their own
transaction.
If the proposed amendment was passed, any control transaction would have the
increased the likelihood of coercion because holdout shareholders would be more
likely to tender their shares for fear that the board of directors would approve the
transaction regardless of whether the shareholders approved of the transaction.
More specifically, in a partial offer, coercion would be increased because holdout
shareholders would face the prospect of holding shares in a captive company.0 2
Finally, Senate Bill 218 would likely have eliminated the ability of the Michigan
Act to govern private sales of control because if a majority of the incumbent board,
or even a single member of the board, possessed a controlling interest in the com-
pany, there would be no need for shareholder approval to authorize the sale of
control. For example, if the controlling interest was held by a majority of the board,
the majority would simply approve to restore voting rights to the acquirer. If the
controlling interest was held by a single member of the board, it would be more
difficult to get a majority vote. But it would be much easier than it would have been
if the shareholders had the ability to veto the transaction. In either case, sharehold-
ers would have had no role, or a limited role, in restoring voting rights in private
sales of control.
Although the Michigan Legislature never passed Senate Bill 218, it did enact
Public Act 181103 on September 18, 2003, in direct response to the litigation involv-
99. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1792 (2003).
100. See MicH. COMp. LAWS § 450.1790(2)(a); § 450.1792.
101. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1792 (2003).
102. Booth, supra note 1, at 1641-42.
103. 2003 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A 181 (H.B. 4764) (West).
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ing Simon Property Group, Inc., and Taubman Centers, Inc."°4 Even though the
litigation involving SPG and TCI involved two Michigan corporations,"' by passing
Public Act 181 the Michigan Legislature nevertheless reassured shareholders in
Michigan corporations that the Michigan Act is protectionist legislation and not
designed to protect the rights of holdout shareholders or reduce coercion.' 6
Public Act 181 amended section 791 of the Michigan Act to provide that "the
formation of a group does not constitute a control share acquisition of shares of an
issuing public corporation held by members of the group."' 7 Public Act 181 also
added section 798(a) to the Michigan Act to provide that "[s]hares without voting
rights because the formation of a group after April 1, 1988 was deemed to be a
control share acquisition shall have the same voting rights as were accorded the
shares before the formation of the group." 108
Apparently it was not enough that the Michigan Legislature passed Public Act
181 in direct response to the court's decision in Simon that the formation of a
group does constitute a control share acquisition; the Michigan Legislature went
one step further and added section 798a, which retroactively applied the new law to
all decisions involving the formation of a group since the Michigan Act was first
passed in 1988, including the court's decision in Simon. °9 Accordingly, the Michi-
gan Legislature effectively overturned the court's decision in Simon and ended any
chance of SPG either winning its case or completing its acquisition of TCI."'
Although the legislative analysis at the time of that the Michigan Act indicates
that the Michigan Act was designed to ward off hostile takeover attempts, the quick
and direct response of the Michigan Legislature to the court's decision in Simon
sends a bad message to shareholders in Michigan corporations."' Public Act 181
says it is unlawful for a single insider to evade a disinterested shareholder vote, but
it is not unlawful for two or more people acting together to evade a disinterested
shareholder vote." 2 Such a change makes the Michigan Act easy to evade and goes
against the Act's intent.
In passing Public Act 181, the Michigan Legislature accepted the argument from
proponents of the new law that takeovers reduce shareholder premiums and are
bad for Michigan corporations and their shareholders. Such reasoning is incorrect.
Shareholders in takeovers often receive higher premiums for their shares, and Pub-
104. See H.B. 4764, Committee Summary (June 17, 2003).
105. See id.
106. Booth, supra note 1, at 1668 (citing John C. Coffee Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1986)).
107. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1791(6) (2003).
108. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1798a (2003).
109. The governor of Michigan signed Public Act 181 into law on Oct. 7, 2003, and one week later TCI
dropped its appeal. 2003 Mich. Legis. Serv. P.A 181 (H.B. 4764) (West); Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc., 373
F.3d 656, 661 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004).
110. Glancy, 373 F.3d at 661 n.S.
111. See H.B. 4764, Committee Summary (June 17, 2003).
112. H.B. 4764 Legislative Analysis (June 5, 2003).
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lic Act 181 will reduce shareholder premiums by impairing shareholder rights and
making it easier for the board of directors to reject higher offers for shares in order
to maintain control of a corporation. For example, in the Simon case the newly
amended Michigan Act would have made it easier for the board of directors of TCI
to reject SPG's offer of twenty dollars per share for stock that was previously trad-
ing at fifteen dollars per share on the market." 3 Finally, one critic of Public Act 181
who was involved in drafting the Michigan Act stated that the Michigan Act "was
designed to provide shareholders of issuing public corporations an opportunity to
have their voices heard when control of the corporation is at stake, so that the
'control premium' for shareholders of the corporation is not appropriated by a
group of inside shareholders for their own benefit without any say-so from the
other shareholders."
'
"
4
III. WHY CONTROL SHARE STATUTES SHOULD APPLY
TO NEWLY ISSUED SHARES
In any two-tier tender offer coercion is always a possibility because of the compet-
ing interests at work, yet courts and scholars appear to agree that coercive tender
offers should not be prohibited." 5 Courts have continually refused to rule that co-
ercive tender offers are illegal; rather, they maintain that the purpose behind the
Williams Act" 6 is to ensure a fair fight among the bidder and shareholders." 7 Nev-
ertheless, coercion remains a concern in any partial or two-tier tender offer. This
section will briefly discuss the competing interests involved in two-tier tender of-
fers, followed by a discussion on how control share statutes eliminate much of the
coercion as long as the control share statutes include shares issued directly to in-
cumbent management.
Shareholders like premiums. It is arguable that shareholders lose out in two-tier
tender offers, but on average, shareholders as a whole appear to gain from all
tender offers."' The inherent coercive nature of any tender offer is that any pre-
mium is often viewed as better than no premium at all, thus holdout shareholders
will tender their shares for fear that they will receive no premium at all. Yet in some
situations shareholders will receive less than market value for their shares because
they cannot negotiate as a group.
Shareholders are rarely, if ever, a cohesive and closely knit group. They are often
dispersed across the country and lack the resources or methods of communication
113. About 85% of the common stock holders in TCI tendered their shares in response to SPG's offer to
buy their shares for $20 per share. The board of directors still rejected SPG's offer.
114. H.B. 4764 Legislative Analysis (June 5, 2003) at 3-4.
115. See Booth, supra note 1, at 1643-59.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2000).
117. Booth, supra note 1, at 1643 (citing Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985)).
118. See Booth, supra note 1, at 1643-46.
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to coordinate their decisions as a whole."9 For example, in a front loaded two-tier
tender, or even a partial tender offer targeted at individual shareholders, the
holdout shareholders will likely perceive that their stock must be worth more be-
cause the bidder is willing to pay a higher price for their shares. Moreover, because
they are unable to negotiate for a higher price as a group, the individual sharehold-
ers fear the prospect of being stuck with post-bid shares that are worth less. Thus,
the only possible group to represent and negotiate on behalf of the shareholders is
the board of directors.
Coercion will be reduced only if it is assumed that target management remains
active and negotiates aggressively for a higher price, and of course is willing to lose
control over the corporation if the takeover is successful. Inherent in this assump-
tion is that shareholders depend on management to defend against what are per-
ceived to be inadequate offers. Shareholders often oppose such defensive measures,
however, and argue that such tactics are "designed to entrench management."' 12
Such opposition can be seen as evidence that shareholders on average believe
tender offers to be beneficial, yet inherently distrust management. In short, a two-
tier or partial tender offer will always involve the competing interests of sharehold-
ers who want a premium (of any amount) yet lack the capabilities to negotiate for
the best price possible, and who also distrust management to negotiate in their best
interests.
Control share statutes in general reduce coercion by requiring a vote on any
transaction above a certain threshold, thus limiting the pressure to sell for fear of
being relegated to a minority position. 2 ' The ability of shareholders to veto a trans-
action will in most cases force the bidder to divulge the price and motivation for
such an acquisition. Such a requirement allows shareholders to choose whether
they wish to tender their shares on the belief that a sufficient premium has been
offered, or to hold on to their shares on the belief that new management will make
the corporation more profitable. In either case, control share statutes level the play-
ing field and reduce coercion between bidders and shareholders by leaving the ulti-
mate decision to holdout shareholders who are given the ability to negotiate as a
group.
Control share statutes have two coercion-reducing functions: (i) sterilizing shares
acquired beyond a certain threshold and (ii) precluding interested shareholders
from voting to reinfranchise voting rights. These two functions are best discussed
in tandem. The threshold levels at which control share statutes are triggered vary
among the twenty-seven states that have controlled share statutes.'22 Under most
119. Id. at 1647.
120. Id. at 1648.
121. id. at 1679.
122. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
"Race"Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1828 (2001) (noting in Table 3 that as of
2000, 27 states had control share statutes).
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statutes, control share acquisitions are triggered at three separate levels, twenty per-
cent, thirty-three percent, and (a majority of all voting power) 50.1%.12 Moreover,
most, if not all, control share statutes preclude interested shareholders from voting
to restore voting rights to shares in a control share transaction. Interested share-
holders most often include those persons acquiring shares in a control share acqui-
sition, any officer of the issuing corporation, and any director of the issuing
corporation who is also an employee.124 Thus, anytime a person or group acquires
more than a certain percentage of shares, say thirty-three percent, only the disinter-
ested shareholders are able to restore voting rights to those shares acquired in the
control share acquisition.
The only persons besides public shareholders who are allowed to vote are those
directors who are employees of the corporation.'25 This requirement reduces coer-
cion by limiting the competing interests between incumbent management who
likely want to remain in control of the company, and shareholders who are seeking
a premium, but who before control share statutes were unable to negotiate as a
group.'26 For example, in a management buyout the shareholders and management
are adversaries and are not seeking the same results from the transaction. Thus,
shareholder voting can act as a negotiating mechanism between management and
shareholders, because a shareholders vote is equally valuable to the bidder and
management and will likely lead to the shareholders' receiving top dollar for their
shares.'27 Nevertheless, all the coercion-reducing factors between shareholders and
management are eliminated if shares issued directly from the corporation are ex-
empted under control share statutes.
A. The Unforeseen Consequences
Any tender offer will inevitably involve some coercion. Shareholders may tender
their shares for fear of being paid less in the second step of the transaction, or they
may tender their shares because they believe the offer is attractive. 2 At the very
least, in those states with control share statutes, "management and [the] bidder will
present their best cases to the shareholders without the coercion and strategic be-
havior that [ordinarily] attends a tender offer."'29 But if control share statutes are
intended to protect shareholders and reduce coercion, an exemption for newly is-
sued shares to management would not ensure a fair outcome between inside man-
agement and holdout shareholders. Rather, such an exemption entrenches
123. MicH-. COMP. LAWS § 450.1790 (2003); IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (2003).
124. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1792; IND. CODE § 23-1-42-3, (2003).
125. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1792 (2003).
126. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-3, Official Comment (2003) (stating that the General Assembly believed that
inside directors also have other interests "threatened by [an] acquisition, such as preserving their positions [in]
the corporation").
127. Booth, supra note 1, at 1684.
128. See id. at 1683.
129. Id.
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incumbent management and eliminates the ability of shareholders to tender their
shares without the board of directors' approval.
The most obvious example of entrenchment that results from the exclusion of
shares issued to incumbent management is the incumbent board's ability to issue
itself new shares whenever they feel threatened by an outside corporation. Control
share statutes were designed to sterilize a bidder, or any other twenty-percent
shareholder, from assuming control of the company without shareholder approval,
not management's approval. Yet, by exempting newly issued shares from control
share statutes, inside management can issue new shares to itself and gain or main-
tain control of a corporation and effectively eliminate any protections the control
share statutes offered shareholders. For example, suppose a current member of the
board already controls a forty-percent interest in a company, with sixty percent
being controlled by the remaining shareholders. If a person acquires a twenty-per-
cent interest in a company, and the forty-percent controlling interest of the incum-
bent manger is allowed to vote, he will obviously vote to approve such a transaction
because his forty-percent interest has just become a fifty-percent majority interest
in the company. Before the bidder acquired the twenty-percent interest, the re-
maining shareholders retained control of the company, but by allowing the con-
trolling interest holder to vote, there has been a fundamental shift in the nature of
control. For this reason, control share statutes do not allow incumbent manage-
ment to vote to restore voting rights, and should apply to shares issued to incum-
bent management.
CONCLUSION
Control share statutes were enacted to reduce coercion and ensure a fair outcome
between bidders and holdout shareholders in tender offers. Unfortunately, the Si-
mon court disregarded the intent behind control share statutes and found that the
acquisition of newly issued shares from a corporation is not a control share acquisi-
tion within the meaning of the Michigan Act. By so ruling, the court in Simon
grants too much power to incumbent management and negates any attempts by
shareholders to tender their shares in what they believe to be a profitable tender
offer.
In addition, the decision by the court in Simon coupled with the quick response
from the Michigan Legislature in amending the Michigan Act and the decision by
the Utah Legislature in amending the Utah Act, further supports the argument that
control share statutes are being amended and interpreted with the idea of protect-
ing local corporations, rather than protecting the interests of shareholders in tender
offers.13° For example, Public Act 181 now makes it easier for incumbent manage-
ment to evade the Michigan Act by simply forming a group. Shareholders, espe-
130. The Michigan Legislature clearly states that the Michigan Act is designed to protect Michigan corpora-
tions from hostile takeover attempts. H.B. 4764 Legislative Analysis (June 5, 2003).
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cially those in Michigan corporations, are now less likely "to have their voices heard
when control of the corporation is at stake," such as when the control premium of
the corporation is trying to be appropriated "by a group of inside shareholders for
their own benefit without any [say] from the other shareholders."'31
Control share statutes were designed to level the playing field and reduce coer-
cion between outside bidders and shareholders by leaving the ultimate decision on
whether a transaction goes through to the shareholders. Nevertheless, the court in
Simon, other courts, and some state legislatures have eliminated many of the coer-
cion-reducing factors within control share statutes by ruling or amending statutes
to state that newly issued shares to incumbent management are exempt under con-
trol share statutes or that forming a group does not constitute a control share
acquisition. In short, an exemption from control share statutes for newly issued
shares to incumbent management eliminates many of the coercion-reducing factors
inherent in control share statutes, entrenches current management by allowing
them to issue shares to themselves whenever a takeover is threatened, and often
makes it impossible for shareholders to tender their shares without the approval of
the board of directors.
131. H.B. 4764 Legislative Analysis (June 5, 2003) at 3-4.
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